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Abstract 
 
In the last two decades, the European Union has become wider and 
deeper. In addition, the number of regional integration arrange-
ments has increased dramatically since early 1990s. Against these 
developments, the focus of regional and European integration stud-
ies has shifted away from the motives for and drivers of the integra-
tion process towards policy analysis or the comparative politics or 
regional blocs. This article attempts to bring the regional integra-
tion theory back in by proposing a political economy model that ex-
plains the dynamics of European integration, the reasons as to why 
governments agree to delegate authority to regional (EU) institu-
tions, and the relationship between globalisation and integration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Writing at a time when the European Union (EU) was about to 
complete the single market, Cohan (1991: 200) observed that the 
‘European Community literature’ has become ‘descriptive’ and 
tended to ‘avoid theoretical questions’. This trend has become more 
evident as approaches from policy analysis or comparative politics 
had overtaken the functionalist/neo-functionalist or intergovern-
mentalist theories of the earlier decades. Two major exceptions to 
this trend have been the liberal intergovernmentalist work of Mo-
ravcsik (1993, 1998); and the work inspired by Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet, who attempt to combine neo-functionalism with histori-
cal/sociological institutionalism (see the collection of articles in 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998; and Stone Sweet et al, 2001).  
 
Another characteristic of the 1990s was the attempt from econo-
mists to understand the motives for regional integration. This was in 
contrast to earlier attempts that had been interested in welfare con-
sequences of regional integration rather than its causes. This new 
interest was closely related to the proliferation regional integration 
arrangements (RIAs).
1  
 
These trends point out to a degree of disciplinary re-alignment in 
the study of regional integration. In this re-alignment, the discipline 
that tended to focus on the causes and drivers of regional integration 
in general and European integration in particular (i.e., political sci-
ence) began to focus on EU policy processes and consequences of 
the EU system for national politics and policy-making. In contrast, 
the discipline that had focussed on the consequences of regional in-
tegration (i.e., economics) began to ask questions about the motives 
that induce governments to engage in regional integration.  
 
In this article, we aim to contribute to the recent economics and po-
litical science literature that focuses on the causes and drivers of re-
gional integration in general and European integration in particular. 
Due to space constraints, we limit our empirical references only to 
                                                 
1   Outside Europe, 50 RIAs were concluded within five years from 1990-94. As 
of 2000, almost all members of the World Trade Organisation were either 
members of, or negotiating participation in, at least one RIA. 76  European Political Economy Review  
 
European integration, frequently referred to as ‘deep’ integration 
because of the relatively high degree of institutionalisation and su-
pra-nationalism it embodies. We propose a political economy model 
that would enable us to derive some hypotheses about: (i) the dy-
namics of European integration; (ii) the policy-making process of 
the European Union; and (iii) the impact of globalisation on Euro-
pean integration. Although these hypotheses may be relevant to 
other RIAs, we do not elaborate on the extent of their relevance 
simply because of space limitations. 
 
To derive these hypotheses, we build on Hotelling’s (1929) spatial 
competition model. In the proposed model, the government is an ac-
tor whose objective is to maximise constituents’ loyalty to the na-
tional jurisdiction. To maximise loyalty, the government uses dif-
ferent combinations of exit barriers and policy convergence. Whilst 
exit barriers enable the government to prevent loyalty shifts, policy 
convergence enables it to reduce the incentives for loyalty shifts. 
On the other hand, we model constituents as actors whose objective 
is to maximise the returns on their loyalty to a given jurisdiction. To 
maximise these returns, constituents resort to different combinations 
of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’. While exit enables them to shift loyalty to the 
jurisdiction with higher returns; voice enables them to increase the 
returns on loyalty to the current jurisdiction. (For the original exit-
voice-loyalty framework, see Hirschman, 1970). 
 
The article is organised follows. Section 1 identifies the strengths 
and weaknesses of the recent economics and political science litera-
ture that analyses the causes and drivers of European integration. In 
section 2, we build on Hotelling’s spatial competition model to 
demonstrate why governments engage in policy convergence and 
why the latter occurs before formal integration that locks it in. In 
section 3, we demonstrate why policy convergence requires EU-
level institutions as commitment devices. Finally, section 4 explores 
the link between globalisation and European integration and dem-
onstrates that globalisation acts as an exogenous shock that deepens 
the integration process. The conclusions will summarise the main 
findings and suggest new research directions in the study of Euro-
pean integration.  
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2.  Recent Work on the Causes of and Motives for Regional In-
tegration: A Review  
 
A theory or model of integration must address two essential ques-
tions. First, why do governments agree to binding rules and com-
mon policies that tie their hands and reduce the choice for their con-
stituents? Secondly, why do sovereign governments delegate au-
thority to regional institutions that monitor government compliance 
with common policies and rules? 
 
The first-generation economic theories of integration could not ad-
dress these questions because their focus was on the welfare impli-
cations of regional integration rather than its causes. This was evi-
dent in Viner (1950), whose main concern was whether regional in-
tegration would improve welfare.
2  
 
Recently, a new strand of economics literature began to address the 
question as to why countries participate in RIAs. For example, 
Baldwin (1995) proposes a domino theory of integration, which 
suggests that a country joins an RIA to avoid the cost of discrimina-
tion that outsiders are likely to face. The domino theory, however, 
cannot explain why: (i) an RIA such as the EU is established in the 
first place; and (ii) some RIAs have an open-membership policy 
(e.g. APEC) or expand despite the fact that the benefits of being an 
‘insider’ decreases as membership size increases (e.g., the EU).  
 
These shortcomings instigated a search for a ‘public good’ ration-
ale. One public good that a RIA could provide is reduced transac-
tion costs. This view is first put forward by Krugman (1993) and is 
supported by Baldwin (1997). Another public good is effective di-
plomacy (Schiff and Winters, 1997). An RIA leads to increased im-
port from the partner and, thereby, reduces the latter’s security con-
cerns. Therefore, the RIA succeeds where conventional diplomacy 
may fail. A third type of public good is policy credibility. Joining an 
                                                 
2   Viner’s work led to a large number of studies that tried to identify the condi-
tions under which regional integration could improve welfare – i.e., trade 
creation could outweigh trade diversion. For a review, see Robson (1998: 1-
62). 78  European Political Economy Review  
 
IRA increases policy credibility because the subscription to an ‘ac-
quis’ reduces the probability of policy reversals.
3  
 
One problem with the ‘public good’ approach is that its specifica-
tion of the government-constituent interaction is too simplistic. 
Generally, the median-voter theorem is assumed to hold. Under this 
assumption, the government will maximise its objective function 
subject to the constraint of median voter preferences. This specifica-
tion implies that a country’s EU membership is essentially a reflec-
tion of the median-voter preferences. Such a hypothesis, however, 
cannot be upheld in the face of frequent difficulties that EU gov-
ernments experience in securing support for their involvement in 
the EU. This hypothesis is also incompatible with the tendency of 
many EU governments to avoid referendums on crucial integrative 
steps.  
 
Some economists are aware of the need to specify the government-
constituent interaction more satisfactorily. For example, Krugman 
(1993: 58-59) states that regional integration may be intended to 
protect governments not only from each other, but also from their 
own interest groups. Applied to the EU context, Krugman’s propo-
sition implies that regional integration constitutes a new institu-
tional context for government-constituent interaction, which re-
duces (for example) the risk of trade policy capture by interest 
groups.  
 
De Melo et al (1993: 177, 180-81) concur with this suggestion and 
demonstrate that regional integration may have a ‘preference dilu-
tion effect’. According to De Melo et al, regional integration re-
duces the marginal utility of lobbying as the regional authority, 
compared to the national authority, has to contend with a much lar-
ger number of groups clamouring for attention. Therefore, it will be 
less likely to accommodate a particular group demands for special 
treatment. This constraint on the regional authority will induce in-
terest groups to reduce the intensity of their lobbying activities be-
                                                 
3   There is a burgeoning literature on this type of public good. See, Fernandez 
(1997: 7-27) for a review of the non-traditional benefits of regional integra-
tion. For the ‘anchoring’ benefits of RIAs in the Mediterranean context, see 
Francois (1997) and Lawrence (1997).  Ugur: European Integration under Globalisation 79 
cause of the reduced chance of securing favourable outcomes from 
lobbying.
4 
 
This is a step in the right direction, but remains open to a valid criti-
cism. It is true that as the jurisdiction size increases, the number of 
interest groups also increases, leading to lower probability of de-
mand accommodation by a regional authority such as the EU. How-
ever, the increase in jurisdiction size does not prevent the formation 
of sector-specific, EU-wide coalitions. In fact, this has proved to be 
the case: European integration has led to a marked increase in the 
number of EU-wide interest groups lobbying the EU directly. 
Therefore, and as we will demonstrate in part 2, the preference dilu-
tion effect, if any, must come through different channels.  
 
The political science literature on European integration is both older 
and more extensive. In fact, a review of the literature on European 
integration only has to be either limited to a particular ap-
proach/period or can fit only into a fully-fledged monograph.
5 Yet, 
the political science literature suffers from two shortcomings.  
 
First, the literature has been characterised by a shift of focus from 
the causes and drivers of the integration process to the study of ei-
ther EU institutions/policies or consequences of integration, some-
times referred to as Europeanization.
6 In a way, this is a natural out-
come because of the deepening and enlargement of the EU, and the 
cumulative effects of EU legislation on national legislation. How-
ever, it can sometimes lead to or reflect a presumption that the the-
ory of integration (i.e., a theory that explains the motives for and the 
drivers of integration) is now less relevant or urgent.
7  
                                                 
4   This reasoning is similar to that of the 18th-century American Federalists, 
who argued that federation would reduce the risk of policy capture that was 
observed at the local state level. 
5   For recent reviews, see Rosamond (2000), Pollack (2001), and Jachtenfuchs 
(2001). 
6   For a representative list of recent work on Europeanization, see European Re-
search Papers Archive at the Queen University of  Belfast website. Address: 
www.qub.ac.uk/ies-old/onlinepapers/poe.html. See also, U. Sedelmeier and F. 
Schimmelfennig (200s). 
7   We do not discuss the implications of this tendency for the reciprocal com-
munication between what we call integration theory and theories of EU pol-
icy-making or Europeanization due to space limitation. 80  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
As indicated above, Moravcsik (1993, 1998), Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet, (1998) and Stone Sweet et al. (2001) are notable exceptions 
to this tendency. However, these contributions can be criticised for 
the second shortcoming associated with the political science litera-
ture – namely reductionism.
8 These contributions reduce European 
integration to the preferences of either transnational actors (as ar-
gued in functionalist/neo-functionalist theories or the earlier period) 
or governments (as it is the case in intergovernmantalist theories). 
Yet, the question remains as to why integration remains acceptable 
to one of these actors even though it essentially reflects the prefer-
ences of the opposite party. After all, governments have the option 
to withdraw from a regional integration arrangement if the latter es-
sentially serves the interests of the trans-national actors at its own 
expense. Similarly, non-governmental, trans-national actors are also 
capable to vote out a pro-integration government if integration is es-
sentially collusion between like-minded governments.  
 
The contributors to Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998) take the de-
bate on European integration a significant step beyond the society-
centric reductionism of the functionalist/neo-functionalist theory. In 
the introduction, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1998) hypothesise 
that three inter-related variables determine the move towards deeper 
integration (or supranationalism) in the EU: (i) EU rules that con-
strain behaviour of the political actors operating at the EU level; (ii) 
EU organisations that execute the EU rules; and (iii) supranational 
society that engages in cross-border exchange. Their theory sug-
gests that any increase in one of these independent variables leads 
to an increase in the remaining two, and more importantly, to a 
deepening of the integration process.  
 
The hypothesis is tested with two data sets. First, Fligstein and 
McNichol (1998: 78-79) examine the relationship between the sec-
ondary legislative output (regulations and directives) and the num-
ber of major EU-wide pressure groups. Their findings suggest that 
there is a positive correlation of 0.41 between the number of pres-
sure groups formed and legislative output in dis-aggregated policy 
domains.  
                                                 
8   On this, see Ugur (1997). Ugur: European Integration under Globalisation 81 
 
This is a significant step in the direction of developing testable hy-
potheses and testing their relevance. Yet, there are two problems 
with Fligstein and McNichol’s analysis. First, the sequence of the 
interest group formation and EU legislation is important. If group 
formation follows legislation, the role of supranational society in 
deepening the integration process should be rejected. All we can say 
in such cases is that interest groups had to shift their attentions to-
wards the regional authority as the integration process deepened. 
Second, at the aggregate level, the correlation between legislative 
output and organisational activity breaks down totally. This can be 
seen in Table 1 below. If anything, Table 1 suggests that there is an 
inverse  relationship between legislative output and organisational 
activity. This is the case whether we take contemporaneous or 
lagged, total or annual figures.  
 
 
Table 1: Secondary EU Legislation and EU-wide Pressure Groups 
 
A. Total Figures 
 pre  1958  1958-69 1970-79 1980-86 1987-91 1992-94 
Secondary 
Legislation  n.a.  499  2606 3408 3957 5173 
Pressure 
Groups         
Established 
92 351  140 71  40 n.a. 
 
B. Average Annual Figures 
 pre  1958  1958-69 1970-79 1980-86 1987-91 1992-94 
Secondary 
Legislation  n.a  42  261 487 791  1724 
Pressure 
Groups         
Established 
n.a. 29  14  10  8  n.a. 
 
(Source: Fligstein and McNichol, 1998: 80-83). 
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Stone Sweet and Caporaso (1998) come to the rescue of the hy-
pothesis by examining the relationship between intra-EU trade (in-
dicator of transnational transactions) and Article 177 references to 
the European Court of Justice.
9 They demonstrate successfully that 
intra-EU trade is a good predictor of Article 177 references. How-
ever, even if this finding can be generalised, the ‘new’ society-
centric research agenda cannot answer a simple question: why do 
EU governments agree to have an Article 177 in the first place? The 
task of answering this question is left to ‘new’ intergovernmental-
ism, which argues that treaty provisions are determined in intergov-
ernmental bargains.  
 
Moravcsik (1991 and 1993) focuses on the formation of ‘state pref-
erences’ and how these preferences generate ‘demand for integra-
tion.’ Yet, Moravcsik’s early work does not go beyond treating the 
demand for integration as a function of government preferences. He 
essentially theorises the government’s demand for integration given 
the constraint imposed by societal preferences. (See, for example, 
Moravcsik, 1993: 482-495, 496-507). Later on, Moravcsik (1998: 8-
9) has adopted a rational-choice perspective. He derives the demand 
for integration endogenously from the strategic interaction between 
governments – specifically from the need for a credible commit-
ment device that would reduce the probability of defection.  
 
This move has not enabled Moravcsik to resolve the preference 
formation problem for two reasons. First, Moravcsik is now faced 
with an obvious inconsistency: why does he not endogenise the out-
comes of government-constituent interaction whilst he does en-
dogenise the outcomes of government-government interaction? 
Secondly, if outcomes of government-government interaction are 
endogenous, the impact of exogenously given constituent prefer-
ences on governments’ demand for integration is blurred even if it 
does not disappear altogether. That is why Moravcsik (1998) is still 
an account of how EU governments bargain with each other, and 
                                                 
9   Article 177 provides for European Court of Justice rulings when European 
Community law is material to the resolution of the legal dispute heard by na-
tional courts. In that sense, it indicates a move towards supranationalism  or 
deeper integration – i.e., the dependent variable of the hypothesis tested by 
Stone Sweet and Caporaso. Ugur: European Integration under Globalisation 83 
not an account of how government-constituent interaction induces 
governments to adopt convergent policies which, in turn, makes his 
‘celebrated bargains’ necessary and feasible.  
 
The brief review above demonstrates that existing work on regional 
integration in general and European integration in particular does 
not provide unambiguous answers as to why governments (i) dele-
gate authority to EU institutions; and (ii) agree to binding rules and 
common policies at the regional level. In section 2 below, we pro-
pose a political economy model that may be useful in establishing 
the basis for tackling these questions. 
 
 
3.   Policy Convergence as a Means of Stabilising Constituent 
Loyalty 
 
There are two obvious stylised facts about the EU: (i) the adoption 
of common policies in some policy areas; and (ii) the establishment 
of regional institutions that propose new policies and supervise 
compliance with agreed ones. Therefore, any theory of integration 
must explain how government policies converge towards the com-
mon policy stance and why governments voluntarily delegate au-
thority to regional institutions. The model proposed here addresses 
these two elementary questions. 
 
The model involves two governments and their constituents. The 
government is appointed by constituents to supply a composite pub-
lic good – i.e., ‘public policy’. Its objective is to maximise the con-
stituents’ loyalty to the jurisdiction over which the public good is 
supplied. To do this, it can use two instruments: (i) changing the at-
tributes of the public good; and/or (ii) changing the cost/benefits as-
sociated with the constituents’ decisions to ‘exit’ the jurisdiction. 
Constituents are private actors who consume the public good 
against contributions towards the cost of its supply. To maximise 
the returns on loyalty to a jurisdiction, the constituents can choose 
either to raise their ‘voice’ by lobbying, protesting, voting in an al-
ternative government, etc; and/or they can ‘exit’ the jurisdiction in 
the sense that they consume the public supplied by another govern-
ment. (For the original exit-voice-loyalty analysis, see Hirschman, 
1970).  84  European Political Economy Review  
 
 
This setting is similar to the spatial competition model of Hotelling 
(1929), who demonstrated that two firms would locate next to each 
other in order to maximise the number of loyal customers. The 
model can be (and has been) extended to explain convergence in 
prices or product qualities (see for example, D’Aspermont et al, 
1979) or convergence of political party programmes (see, for exam-
ple, Downs, 1957).  
 
Hotelling and the models that followed share a number of common 
assumptions. For example, customers (or voters) are rational actors 
trying to maximise utility; there is perfect information about the 
costs/benefits of switching between suppliers/parties; there are no 
artificial barriers to switching between suppliers/parties; and suppli-
ers/parties can ‘leap frog’ each other (i.e., change positions) to 
maximise loyalty. Under these assumptions, location, quality or 
price convergence tends to be perfect. This is known as the princi-
ple of minimum differentiation  – as depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Inter-Firm Convergence 
 
 a         ●                 b                          ●●               c       ●    d 
F1                                          F1’ F2’                           F2 
 
 
Suppose the customers are distributed along the line a+b+c+d. Cus-
tomers in (a) are loyal to Firm 1 (F1) and those in (d) are loyal to F2. 
However, customer loyalty in segments (b) and (c) is contestable, 
because each firm can adjust its location (or price or product quality, 
etc.) so as to increase the number of loyal customers. For example 
F1 can move to the right in order to increase the size of (a) and lure 
some marginal customers in (c). On the other hand, F2 can move to 
the left to increase the size of (d) and lure some of the marginal cus-
tomers in (b). This strategic interaction between firms and between 
the latter and their customers will continue until both firms locate 
next to each other at F1’ and F2’. The equilibrium at F1’ and F2’ is 
stable because for each marginal customer gained by one firm due Ugur: European Integration under Globalisation 85 
to further movement there is a marginal customer lost to the other 
firm. 
 
We must indicate here that this outcome is sub-optimal for both 
firms and customers. For customers, who instigate competition by 
switching loyalty between suppliers, convergence is a sub-optimal 
outcome because it reduces choice. The outcome is sub-optimal for 
the firms too. Although it enables each firm to stabilise its market 
share, it deprives it of the ability to increase that market share at the 
expense of its rival.  
 
Hotelling’s original model has been criticised for over-emphasis on 
perfect convergence. For example, D’Aspermont et al (1979) dem-
onstrated that perfect convergence is sustainable only if equilibrium 
prices are zero. Given that this condition implies zero profits, the 
firms would not choose to locate next to each other. In fact, 
D’Aspermont et al demonstrated that equilibrium prices in Hotel-
ling’s model would imply a location at or near mid-points of each 
firm’s market segment. However, at this location, the marginal prof-
its are positive and increasing in the value of (a) and (d). In other 
words, each firm has incentive to increase the size of (a) and (d) by 
moving closer to the centre. Therefore, Hotelling was right in pre-
dicting convergence, but this convergence is not necessarily perfect 
and the process is messier than he envisaged.
10 
The application of Hotelling’s model to political processes has also 
been criticised. For example, Adams and Merrill (1999) argue that 
the model overlooks the voters’ non-policy motivations shaped by 
socio-demographic characteristics, partisanship, or retrospective 
policy evaluations. If such motivations are allowed for (i.e., if 
costs/benefits of loyalty shifts are not as transparent as Hotelling as-
sumed), convergence between parties may remain limited. Drawing 
on a similar theme, Adams (2001) demonstrates that convergence 
                                                 
10  Imperfect convergence is also derived by Wang and Yang (1999), who dem-
onstrates that convergence will approximate Hotelling’s principle of minimum 
differentiation when the customers’ reservation price (i.e., their willingness to 
pay for quality) decreases. Irmen and Thisse (1998) too demonstrates that 
convergence is imperfect when firms compete on the basis of multiple product 
characteristics. Under this scenario, firms will diverge with respect to the 
dominant characteristic but will converge with respect to the remaining n-1 
characteristics. 86  European Political Economy Review  
 
will also be limited if the voters are biased - i.e., if their loyalty to a 
party is high due to the impact of party leader’s image, or the im-
pact of social-psychological attachments rooted in class, religion, or 
ethnicity.  
 
Perfect convergence does not obtain either when the units of analy-
sis are governments and their constituents. Governments, as agents 
with territorial competence, can erect artificial barriers against con-
stituent loyalty shifts by using border controls and imposing sanc-
tions. In other words, territorially competent governments divide the 
‘constituent market’ and add to the normal cost of ‘exit’. In addition, 
costs/benefits of loyalty to (or exit from) the jurisdiction are not 
fully transparent because of the constituents’ social, cultural or 
ideological attachments to a given jurisdiction.  Therefore, the ex-
tent of policy convergence as a means of stabilising constituent loy-
alty is less than perfect. This outcome can be followed in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Inter-Government Convergence 
 
 
   a       ●             b             ●                      ●          c           ●   d 
   
G1                          G1’                        G2’                   G2 
 
 
The first government (G1) is assumed to have erected more strin-
gent barriers against loyalty shifts – hence the bolder line demarcat-
ing its jurisdiction. Because barriers increase the cost of exit, G1’s 
constituents will have to rely more heavily on voice and will cross 
the jurisdiction only when the benefits of ‘exit’ are sufficiently high. 
In G2, the cost of exit is lower. Therefore, G2’s constituents will 
rely more heavily on exit compared to those of G1.This asymmetry 
implies that G1 will be less and G2 more willing to engage in con-
vergence as a means of stabilising constituent loyalty. As a result, 
G1 will move only to G1’ whereas G2 moves further to G2’. This 
imperfect convergence, however, is unstable.   
 
One reason is that G1 can increase the number of loyal constituents 
by moving marginally to the right. In response, G2 must either Ugur: European Integration under Globalisation 87 
move to the left of G2’ or increase the barriers. The other reason is 
that G2 can also increase the number of loyal constituents by mov-
ing to the left of G2’. Then, G1 will have to respond either by in-
creasing the barriers or by converging towards G2. This strategic in-
teraction can continue indefinitely as long as perfect convergence is 
impossible due to the existence of barriers to constituent loyalty 
shifts.  
 
The preceding analysis suggests that policy convergence is an en-
dogenous outcome of strategic interaction at two levels: govern-
ment-constituent interaction at the national level and government-
government interaction at the international level.
11 Given this find-
ing we can now propose two hypotheses that would highlight the 
difference between our approach and the state- or society-centric 
approaches to European integration.  
 
The analysis above suggests that governments adopt convergent 
policies  before any ‘major bargain’ on international agreements. 
Convergence results from government attempts to stabilise con-
stituent loyalty, and not from intergovernmental negotiations that 
may lead to agreements codifying the primordial policy conver-
gence. Negotiations between governments may be functional for 
fine tuning purposes, but it is not the cause of convergent policy 
choices. Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) on European integra-
tion can be stated as follows: the convergence of national policies 
precedes the inter-governmental negotiations aimed at establishing 
or deepening the EU.  
 
H1 implies that intergovernmentalists are fighting the windmills 
when they focus on intergovernmental bargains as the engine of the 
integration process. If regional integration is the adoption of com-
mon policies (i.e., if integration implies codification of convergent 
policies) and establishment of regional institutions for ensuring 
compliance with those policies, it is obvious that its probability 
should increase if bargaining on common policies and regional in-
                                                 
11  Putnam (1988) was a sophisticated attempt at modelling the two-level game. 
However, Putnam’s constrained (as opposed to strategic) optimisation re-
mains the major source of the vulnerability that haunts Moravcsik’s (1998) 
approach too.  88  European Political Economy Review  
 
stitutions is preceded by convergent policy choices. It is also clear 
that any such convergence is an endogenous outcome that govern-
ments have to live with in order to stabilise constituent loyalty. 
Therefore, the drive towards regional integration begins within the 
national jurisdiction before the negotiations at the regional level. 
Unless this condition is satisfied, intergovernmental bargaining 
would remain a highly erratic process, the outcome of which cannot 
be predicted.  
 
In addition, policy convergence is not necessarily compatible with 
ex ante government or constituent preferences. In other words, pol-
icy convergence may well be a sub-optimal outcome that govern-
ments and constituents have to satisfice with. Sub-optimality is due 
to collective action problems faced by constituents as well as gov-
ernments. As rational agents, constituents do try to maximise the re-
turns on loyalty to a given jurisdiction. However, they are not moti-
vated to contribute to the cost of the public policy, the quality of 
which determines the returns on jurisdictional loyalty. Similarly, the 
governments’ collective action problem is manifested in their ten-
dency to maximise constituent loyalty at the expense of their com-
petitors. Therefore, the second hypothesis (H2) on regional integra-
tion can be stated as follows: neither primordial policy convergence 
nor the integration arrangement that embodies it can be reduced to 
either government of societal preferences in favour of integration.  
 
H2 implies that state- or society-centric theories of integration are 
essentially reductionist exercises with teleological connotations. By 
relating integration to ex ante government or constituent demands 
for integration, state- or society-centric analyses boil down to dem-
onstration of how pre-existing preferences are realised despite the 
odds. What is involved, however, is a more complicated process: 
policy convergence and the EU institutions that codify it are not 
pre-mediated outcomes. Rather, they emerge historically as solu-
tions to collective action problems encountered in government-
constituent and government-government interaction.  
 
Now let us consider these hypotheses in the light of some evidence 
on European integration. 
 Ugur: European Integration under Globalisation 89 
Of course, as Moravcsik (1991, 1993 and 1998) and Cameron 
(1992: 59-64) among others have demonstrated, intergovernmental 
bargains did precede major integrative steps. The significance of 
this finding, however, is less than what is read into it. That is be-
cause, in all major stages of European integration, intergovernmen-
tal bargaining has been preceded by a marked convergence in policy 
choices.  
 
This was evident before the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome. After 
the war, constituents became more assertive and posed a serious 
challenge to the legitimacy of post-war governments.
12 Faced with a 
decrease in constituent loyalty, European governments reacted by 
approximating their policies with a view to reduce the incentives for 
‘exit’. This policy convergence took the form of commitment to in-
tra-European trade liberalisation as a basis for economic growth.
13 It 
was this primordial convergence towards a managed and territori-
ally limited trade liberalisation that underpinned and facilitated the 
intergovernmental bargaining that led to the establishment of the 
EC as a customs union.
14 
 
Similar convergence processes were also at work before two major 
steps in the deepening of European integration: the single market 
and the establishment of the monetary union.  
 
The single market was preceded by a process of policy convergence 
that is often neglected in the literature – namely, the gradual move 
away from Keynesian demand management towards supply-side 
economic policies. This process was reflected first in the change of 
government in the United Kingdom and was spread to the rest of 
Europe from 1979-83. It engulfed not only the centre-right govern-
                                                 
12   Pizzorno (1964) describe this development as the ‘individualistic mobilisation 
of Europe’.  
13  This policy convergence was the basis for the establishment of the European 
Payments Union (EPU) in 1950. On this, see Eichengreen (1993). On the his-
tory of the EPU, see Kaplan and Schleiminger (1989); Milward (1992: 119-
223). 
14   The benefits of managed liberalisation within Europe influenced even the tra-
ditionally sceptic UK and Dutch governments, who began to embrace the 
‘European solution’ to the government-constituent interaction problems from 
mid-1950s onwards. See Milward (1992, 127, 134). 90  European Political Economy Review  
 
ments, but also those of the centre-left, culminating in the conver-
sion of the socialist French government from ‘Keynesianism in one 
country’ to embracing the market discipline in 1983.
15  
 
This convergence was instigated by government concerns about 
constituent loyalty in the face of poor economic performance. In 
that sense, it preceded ‘intergovernmental bargains’ on, or business 
pressure for, deepening the integration process. In fact, intergov-
ernmental bargaining began after the convergence was evident. The 
call for strengthening the internal market was made in the Luxem-
bourg Summit of 1981, and was repeated in following summits until 
1985. Business involvement came even later, when Commission’s 
preparations were well under way. Therefore, the origin of the sin-
gle market lies not in intergovernmental bargains or ‘big business’ 
pressure per se, but in the crisis that the pre-existing conver-
gence/barrier combination was faced with.  
 
Similarly, convergence preceded the establishment of the monetary 
union too. As is well known, attempts at monetary union date back 
to the Werner Report of October 1970. Member states did not en-
dorse the report in full, but picked up some of its recommendations 
that were considered as functional for shielding European econo-
mies against external (mainly US) monetary shocks. The fixed ex-
change rate arrangement (known as the ‘snake in the tunnel’) 
proved unsuccessful, mainly because of the divergence between na-
tional macroeconomic policies. In that sense, the Snake experience 
demonstrated clearly that intergovernmental bargaining or agree-
ments based on such bargaining cannot lead to integration unless 
they are underpinned by a primordial process of policy conver-
gence.
16  
 
                                                 
15   On the convergence of economic policies towards the supply-side, see OECD 
(1988). On the link between this convergence and the establishment of the 
single market, see Cameron (1992: 56-58) and  Sandholtz and Zysman (1989). 
16  Gros and Thygesen (1998: 26) state the reason for the Snake’s failure as fol-
lows: ‘ … differences in policy preferences … overrode any formal undertak-
ing. Even for the participants in the Snake, the exchange-rate commitment 
was insufficient to sustain parallel inflation and compatible budgetary poli-
cies.’ Ugur: European Integration under Globalisation 91 
The success of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the second 
half of the 1980s and the transition to monetary union in the 1990s 
provide further support for H1 and H2. As indicated above, national 
macroeconomic policies began to converge towards a new consen-
sus in the 1980s. The factors conducive to this convergence were 
increased loyalty volatility reflected in increased capital mobility 
and financial innovation, both of which reduced the scope for erect-
ing barriers against constituent loyalty volatility.
17  
 
It was due to macroeconomic policy convergence that the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) was relatively successful in reducing 
nominal and real exchange rate volatility and dampening inflation-
ary expectations. Also, it was this policy convergence that induced 
Germany to relax its ‘economist’ approach to monetary integration, 
which required macroeconomic policy convergence prior to any 
agreement that involved institutionalised monetary integration. 
Once convergent policy choices were evident enough, the frequency 
of re-alignments decreased and speculative capital flows were 
checked. This happy scenario continued until early 1990s, when 
German unification constituted an exogenous shock.  
 
 
4.   Regional Integration as Commitment Mechanism 
 
The analysis in section 2 also enables us to explain why European 
governments may be induced to set up regional institutions for 
‘locking in’ the primordial policy convergence. Let us recall that the 
governments’ territorial competence enables them to erect barriers 
against constituent loyalty shifts. However, territorial competence 
also reduces governments’ ability to maintain a stable conver-
gence/barrier combination that would stabilise constituent loyalty. 
That is because territorial competence generates a collective action 
problem that is characterised by competition for constituent loyalty. 
This problem can be resolved only through policy co-ordination. 
Policy co-ordination, however, enables governments to overcome 
the collective action problem only if they can agree on and imple-
                                                 
17  On the high levels of capital outflows observed in late 1970s and 1980s de-
spite capital controls in France and Italy, see Gros and Thygesen (1998: 128-
136). 92  European Political Economy Review  
 
ment rules that would tie their hands. This condition is derived in 
Figure 3, which is nothing but a ‘blown up’ account of the interac-
tion in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 3 consists of three schedules drawn against two variables. 
The variables are the instruments of convergence (C) and exit barri-
ers (B). The feasible policy frontier (FPF) depicts the feasible com-
binations of C and B that both governments can deploy to achieve a 
given level of constituent loyalty. For simplicity, we assume that 
government 1 (G1) and G2 face the same FPF. The indifference 
curve of G1 (I1) is steeper and reflects the scenario in Figure 2, 
where G1 relies on barriers rather than convergence as a means of 
loyalty stabilisation.  
 
 
Figure 3: Loyalty Stabilisation Requires Binding Agreements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Given the preferences reflected in I1 and I2 and the FPF, the optimal 
combinations of convergence and barriers for each government are 
given by points of tangency (g1 and g2). It can be seen that G1 has a 
barrier bias (Bg1 > Bg2), whereas G2 has a convergence bias (Cg2 > 
Cg1). Given that both governments are sovereign, they will stick to 
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their preferred positions at points g1 and g2. However, sovereignty 
(or territorial competence) is a source of collective action problem 
that renders these positions (hence, the implied constituent loyalty) 
unstable in the long run. This possibility can be derived from Figure 
2, where we demonstrated that the governments’ ability to change 
the convergence/barrier mix is conducive to strategic actions aiming 
to increase their segments of loyal constituents at the expense of 
each other. Then, the only option for stabilising constituent loyalty 
in the long run is to conclude an agreement that would fix the con-
vergence/barrier combination. 
 
If such an agreement is concluded, the equilibrium may be at any 
point between g1 and g2, for example E. However point E may not 
be stable either. That is because at point E, the agreed levels of con-
vergence and barriers are C and B, respectively. These levels how-
ever, satisfy neither G1 nor G2 because Cg2>C>Cg1 and 
Bg2<B<Bg1. In other words, the agreement resulting in C and B is 
not incentive-compatible. Hence, it is not credible. This problem 
can be resolved only if both governments delegate authority to a 
third party that would ensure that the agreement is implemented. 
Given the territorial competence of the governments, the third party 
must have a ‘supranational’ competence.  
 
We can see that the government’s territorial competence is a source 
of strength and weakness. On the one hand, it enables governments 
to change the barrier/convergence mix and, thereby, increase con-
stituent loyalty. On the other hand, however, territorial competence 
creates at least one of the following two problems. First, it makes 
the stability of constituent loyalty an elusive quest because of stra-
tegic interaction. Secondly, territorial competence (or sovereignty) 
allows for stable constituent loyalty only if governments agree to 
delegate authority to a ‘supranational’ body that would tie their 
hands. Then, we can state the third hypothesis (H3) about European 
integration as follows: the demand for integration is a function of 
the collective action problem, which results from government-
constituent interaction and induces governments to renege on their 
contractual commitments.  
 
There is evidence that supports H3 too. As Currie et al (1989) have 
indicated, policy convergence is a ‘relative policy co-ordination’ 94  European Political Economy Review  
 
problem, which involves the approximation of one government’s 
policy towards other governments. The literature on policy co-
ordination also suggests that non-coopoerative interaction between 
governments tends to generate Nash outcomes, which tend to be 
more inefficient the higher is the initial divergence between poli-
cies. (On this, see Currie and Vines, 1988).  
 
Given these findings, it can be seen that policy convergence prior to 
formal integration increases the probability of establishing a com-
mitment mechanism that would force governments to comply with 
formal agreements. We can also see that such commitment mecha-
nisms are necessary to reap the benefits of convergence as a special 
case of policy co-ordination. The commitment mechanism must in-
volve a superior authority that would punish non-cooperative be-
haviour.
18 In addition, that authority must be granted competence to 
distribute the costs/benefits of the cooperative solution. Unless such 
a distribution mechanism exists, policy co-ordination tends to be 
less feasible. (See, Currie et al, 1989: 27). 
 
H3 is also supported by findings of intergovernmentalist research 
on European integration. For example, Moravcsik (1998: 9) states 
clearly that the delegation of authority to supranational institutions 
(or the pooling of sovereignty) occurred in policy areas where the 
member states felt the need for credible commitment. In addition, 
H3 is also supported by the findings of rational-choice institutional-
ism. For example, Garrett (1992) indicates that EU member states 
(as ‘principals’) have established the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) as an ‘agent’ to resolve the problems that might arise out of 
incomplete contracting. Yet, the difference between H3 and inter-
governmental or institutional hypotheses is that, H3 is derived from 
a general theory of integration whereas the others are not. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18   In other words, the superior authority must be capable of resolving the ‘sover-
eign’ government’s punishment dilemma, which was first pointed out by Bu-
chanan (1975). Ugur: European Integration under Globalisation 95 
5.   Globalisation-Integration Linkages 
  
The proposed model also enables us to account for the impact of 
globalisation on regional integration. The key issue in the globalisa-
tion debate is the extent to which cross-border movements of people, 
goods and factors of production lead to policy convergence.
19 The 
extent of policy convergence depends on who is driving the global-
isation process. If societal actors are the driving force, convergence 
is inevitable and complete. Otherwise, it is limited and erratic. In a 
way, these results are similar to the society- and state-centric con-
clusions about the extent of regional integration.  
 
The emerging literature on globalisation-regionalisation linkages is 
also problematic. Because of its state-centric focus, this literature 
explains regionalisation a reactive state response to globalisation. 
According to Sideri (1997: 53), regionalisation is an attempt to re-
duce the pace of globalisation.  A similar view is put forward by 
Hirst and Thompson (1995), who argue that trade blocs allows 
member countries to withstand the global pressures and to pursue 
inward-looking policy objectives that they could not pursue other-
wise.  
 
We think that the model developed above should be the starting 
point for assessing the relationship between globalisation and re-
gional integration. In line with the consensus in the globalisation 
debate, we assume that globalisation increases cross-border mobil-
ity, which makes constituent loyalty to a national jurisdiction more 
volatile. Then, the impact of globalisation on regional integration 
can be captured in Figure 4 below. 
 
Figure 4 is nothing but a replica of Figure 3, with a new feasible 
policy frontier (FPF’) imposed to reflect the reduced level of barri-
ers after globalisation. Assuming that both governments’ prefer-
ences (i.e., the slopes of their indifference curves) remain the same, 
                                                 
19  In the globalisation literature, policy convergence and loss of policy auton-
omy are used interchangeably. The literature can be classified on the basis of 
convergence (policy autonomy loss) implied or on the basis of pressure for 
policy arbitrage. For a review, see Higgot and Reich (1998) and Held et al 
(1999). For a critical view, see Hirst and Thompson (1995). 96  European Political Economy Review  
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 I1’ 
the optimal combinations of convergence and exit barriers are given 
by points g1’ and g2’. Comparing the convergence/barrier combina-
tions before and after globalisation, we see that Bg1’<Bg1; 
Bg2’<Bg2;  Cg1’>Cg1; and Cg2’>Cg2. Stated differently, after 
globalisation, the levels of barriers deployed by each government 
are lower whereas the levels of policy convergence are higher. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Globalisation Requires Further Policy Convergence 
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g1’ and g2’) are not stable. That is because, in the absence of per-
fect convergence, governments always have incentive to change the 
convergence/barrier combination in order to increase the size of 
their loyal constituency. Secondly, the post-globalisation conver-
gence and barrier combinations Cg1’/Bg1’ and Cg2’/Bg2’ are dif-
ferent that those codified in the already existing regional agreement 
(i.e., Cg1/Bg1 and Cg2/Bg2). Therefore, both governments must 
now negotiate a new agreement that would reflect a new compro-
mise (such as point E’ on FPF’). The new agreement would codify 
the mutually-agreed, post-globalisation levels of convergence and 
barriers implied by E’ (i.e., C’ and B’). 
 
The question now is whether the new agreement will codify a lower 
or higher level of convergence compared to what has been codified 
in the previous one. We argue that the new agreement will codify a 
higher level of convergence for two reasons. First, post-
globalisation, barriers are less effective in securing constituent loy-
alty. Second, a reversal to higher barriers and lower convergence 
will be resisted by existing regional institutions that have a vested 
interest in maintaining their existing competencies. As a result, the 
new agreement will settle on a point such as E’, with lower barriers 
(B’ < B) and higher convergence (C’ > C).  
 
Then, the fourth hypothesis (H4) can be stated as follows: global-
isation will lead to deepening of the integration process, which en-
tails increased policy convergence, less exit barriers, and extra 
competence to regional institutions. H4 differs from the hyper-
globalisation hypothesis because it captures the possibility of a ne-
gotiated agreement at E’ as opposed to the complete convergence at 
g2’. H4 also differs from hypotheses that portray regional integra-
tion as a reactive state response to globalisation. Whereas the latter 
predict that the EU would try to use its bargaining power to restrict 
trade and capital mobility under globalisation, our model predicts 
that globalisation will induce the EU to reduce barriers and increase 
policy convergence. Ugur (2003) provides evidence that globalisa-
tion has been accompanied by increased tax policy co-ordination in 
the EU, further competence to EU institutions, and no reversals in 
the liberalisation of capital movements. In addition, the European 
Monetary Union can also be seen as a pro-active response to global-
isation in the sense that it combines the highest degree of conver-98  European Political Economy Review  
 
gence in monetary policy with no reversals in the extent of capital 
mobility. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
One conclusion that can be derived from the analysis above is that 
regional integration in general and European integration in particu-
lar cannot be reduced to government or constituent preferences. In-
stead, integration should be analysed as an endogenous outcome, 
which generates costs and benefits for both governments and their 
constituents.  Under integration, governments benefit from reduced 
constituent loyalty volatility (due to policy convergence) whereas 
constituents benefit from reduced exit barriers. On the other hand, 
however, regional integration causes governments to incur losses 
due to reduced policy autonomy. It also imposes losses on constitu-
ents because the convergence of national policies reduces the incen-
tive for switching loyalty from one jurisdiction to the other. To our 
knowledge, the model proposed in this article is the only one that 
enables us to predict such outcomes. What is more significant how-
ever is that this model is unique in its ability to predict and explain 
the support for as well as the opposition to European integration 
voiced by both governments and societal actors - over time and 
across policy issues.  
 
The second conclusion is that treaties, secondary legislation and EU 
institutions are based on a certain degree of prior policy conver-
gence among governments. This convergence, however, is under-
pinned by the governments’ need to reduce the incentives for con-
stituent loyalty shifts and not by approximation of the views con-
cerning the desirability of regional integration per se. Integration 
emerges as a necessary mechanism that would enable the member 
states to lock in the prior policy convergence. This is a fine but 
highly significant detail because it means that the process of inte-
gration is less orderly than what functionalist/neo-functionalist 
theories would predict and more orderly than what intergovernmen-
talism would predict. Put differently, the findings in this essay chal-
lenges both the ‘spill-over’ thesis and the ambiguity thesis associ-
ated with intergovernmentalism. 
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The third conclusion concerns the relationship between globalisa-
tion and European integration. The analysis above suggests that 
European integration is likely to deepen as cross-border mobility of 
goods, capital, people and information increases as a result of glob-
alisation. The deepening of the integration process, in turn, implies 
that the EU would be contributing to globalisation - understood as 
increased cross-border mobility.  
 
The final conclusion is a statement of humility: we acknowledge 
that the evidence cited in support of the hypotheses derived from 
the model is limited. Therefore, we would like to emphasise the 
avenues for further research that the model may open rather than 
empirical robustness of the model itself. The research avenues en-
couraged by the model requires construction of a number of indices. 
One such index should measure the extent of constituent loyalty 
volatility, as reflected in cross-border movements of goods, people, 
information and capital.  This index can be constructed for different 
policy areas where the extent of European integration would be ana-
lysed. The other index will measure the level of barriers among EU 
countries in relevant policy areas. A third index should capture the 
extent of convergence in policy areas under examination. Finally, 
we need to construct an index measuring the extent of integration in 
a given policy area. This index should include data on EU legisla-
tive output, decision-making rules and the involvement of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice. Then, the hypotheses derived above can be 
tested on the basis of rich data sets capturing the dynamics of the in-
tegration process and the nature of EU policy making.  
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